February 12, 2024
Blog
Eleventh Circuit uses six-prong test to find burden may be substantial under RLUIPA
In the ever-evolving quest to more definitively define what burden is substantial under RLUIPA, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals became the latest to offer a definition. In January the court reversed the grant of summary judgment to a Georgia community, holding that a church’s RLUIPA claim was still viable even if it had not shown all of its religious exercise had been prevented by a land use decision.
Most relevant to RLUIPA case watchers, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that courts should use the six-prong analysis set out in 2020 to assess whether a burden is substantial. Interesting, one of those factors includes an assessment of whether the local government “jerked around” the religious organization. The Court said the “substantial burden inquiry does not require a Plaintiff to establish an ‘unmet’ religious need in the community, and its religious exercise need not be completely hamstrung to meet the substantial burden threshold.”
Vision Warriors, a residential ministry, bought property in Cherokee County, Georgia, to operate a faith-based substance abuse rehabilitation center. The prior owners of the 6.5 acre properly, located in a residential zoning district, operated a dormitory at the property. Vision Warriors moved into the property and began work in early 2018. In April 2018, the County issued a Tenant Occupancy Change (“TOC”) permit to Vision Warriors.
However, over the next several months, the County conducted more investigation into the intended use of the property. In June 2018, the County revoked the TOC because it was determined the property was being used as a temporary shelter. Subsequent appeals and requests for special permit or rezoning into April 2019 were denied. Vision Warriors filed suit on RLUIPA and other grounds, but lost on all claims in the district court.
On appeal, the three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the substantial burden claim. It began by noting that, for a burden to be substantial, there must be more than an incidental effect on religious exercise. Citing 2020 case law, the court clarified that “substantial” does not mean a “complete, total, or insuperable” burden on religious exercise. Vision Warriors argued that it cannot fulfill its mission as a residential ministry if it cannot house persons at is property, and this burden alone was substantial.
The Eleventh Circuit panel ruled that the Georgia district court applied a more exacting standard in determining that Vision Warriors failed to establish a substantial burden had been applied to its religious exercise. The appellate court noted that courts were consider six factors as part of an analysis as to whether a burden was substantial:
- Whether there was a showing of a genuine need for new or more space;
- The extent to which the zoning decision deprives the plaintiff of a way to engage in protected exercise;
- Whether there is a meaningful nexus between the impeded conduct and the religious exercise;
- Whether the City’s decision-making process reflects any arbitrariness evidencing any animus;
- Whether the denial was final or the claimant has a chance to modify the application; and
- Whether the burden is attributable to the government or if it was self-imposed.
In this instance, the district court erred because preventing Vision Warriors from operating its residential program was a substantial burden. The fact that Vision Warriors could continue non-residential religious exercise did not alleviate that burden, nor was Vision Warriors required to show that all of its religious exercise was totally precluded.
Overall, RLUIPA litigators will appreciate the list of six factors the Eleventh Circuit first broke out in 2020 and now continues to follow in evaluating whether a burden on religious exercise is substantial. We will also be watching to see if more circuit courts of appeal follow this decision and set out similar factors to evaluate.
The litigators at Cortez & Attorneys have more than a decade of experience litigating RLUIPA and related matters in federal courts across the country. This includes early resolution, comprehensive litigation and federal jury trial experience. If you believe you might have a claim under RLUIPA or related First Amendment protections, please contact Daniel Cortez to discuss this further.
Where a challenged ordinance is neutral on its face, a plaintiff seeking to establish a nondiscrimination claim under RLUIPA must put forth evidence of the government’s “discriminatory intent.” Accordingly, courts assessing discriminatory intent consider a multitude of factors, including the series of events leading up to a land use decision, the context in which the decision was made, whether the decision or decision-making process departed from established norms, statements made by the decision-making body and community members, reports issued by the decision-making body, whether a discriminatory impact was foreseeable, and whether less discriminatory avenues were available.
RLUIPA allows for a person to assert a violation of RLUIPA and obtain “appropriate relief” against a government, although the statute does not define what appropriate relief means. To date, courts have taken this to mean that religious organizations can obtain not only injunctive relief – such as the award of a previously denied permit – but also economic damages. This includes all classes of damages that are recoverable under 42 USC 1983, including economic and noneconomic damages. Punitive damages are also recoverable.
Notably, RLUIPA includes a safe harbor provision that allows the government to “avoid the preemptive force of any provision of this chapter by changing the policy or practice that results in a substantial burden on religious exercise, by retaining the policy or practice and exempting the substantially burdened religious exercise, by providing exemptions from the policy or practice for applications that substantially burden religious exercise, or by any other means that eliminates the substantial burden.” In other words, when a RLUIPA claim arises the government has an opportunity to voluntarily cease the conduct alleged to violate RLUIPA prior to formal litigation.
RLUIPA specifically provides that the prevailing party is entitled to recover their attorney fees from the opposing party. This consideration should be taken into account by both the plaintiff and the government.
RLUIPA is not a blanket exemption from zoning laws. As a general matter, religious institutions must apply for the same permits, follow the same requirements, and go through the same land use processes as other land use applicants. RLUIPA prohibits a local government from applying zoning laws or regulations in a way that substantially burdens religious exercise without a compelling justification pursued through the least restrictive means, or from that government treating religious uses less favorably than similarly situated nonreligious assemblies and institutions.
Because RLUIPA relates to the free exercise of religion, many RLUIPA cases involve state and federal First Amendment claims, such as Free Exercise and Free Assembly claims. Additionally, a RLUIPA plaintiff might allege Equal Protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.
If you believe you might have a claim under RLUIPA or related First Amendment protections, please contact Daniel Cortez if you wish to discuss this further.
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